Global Administrative Law Dimensions of International Organizations Law*

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Abstract
Several important legal features of the contemporary practice of international organizations (IOs) are not easily accommodated in standard approaches to international organizations law. This article argues that Global Administrative Law (GAL) approaches may strengthen analysis of operational issues such as emergency actions by IOs and the human rights implications of IO activities, structural issues such as the involvement of IOs in field missions and in public-private partnerships, and normative issues concerning the production and effects of non-treaty regulatory instruments by IOs (guidelines, best practices, national policy assessments, and other documents rather amorphously analyzed under the ‘soft law’ rubric). In examining these activities as forms of administration (broadly understood), subject to precepts of good administration and legal

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standards concerning transparency, participation, reason-giving, review, and accountability, a GAL perspective provides a basis both for critique of problematic practices, and for increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of some beneficial IO activities which are contentious or currently not undertaken. GAL also responds to the proliferation and differentiation of IOs and other entities in global governance through applying legal standards to their interactions, bringing a principled ‘inter-public’ approach to the legal relations among global public entities. GAL provides a valuable, and thus far overly neglected, addition to the field of international institutional law.

**Keywords**

international organizations; international institutional law; global administrative law; emergency powers; field operations; public and private partnerships; human rights; accountability; normative fragmentation

### 1. Introduction

Many of the contemporary operations of inter-governmental organizations (IOs) have not been well conceptualized in legal terms, nor even studied in much detail, in traditional approaches to the law of international institutions. In this paper we argue that the emerging field of global administrative law (GAL) may provide a conceptual framework for addressing some of these under-theorized practical legal problems. We suggest that this may contribute to the reframing and deepening of the existing field of international institutional law. The central section of the paper seeks to substantiate this argument with reference to five sets of practical problems in the current work.

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2) Several leading works have called for such a remaking of the field. *E.g.*, J.E. Alvarez, “International Organizations: Then and Now”, *100 American Journal of International Law*.
of IOs (although many other practical problems would be equally deserving of consideration in this agenda.3) Two of these sets of problems are broadly operational, two are more structural, and the fifth involves the treatment of normative outputs of IOs. These five sets of problems are the following.

1. Emergency Actions by IOs. Several IOs have taken, and in special cases many should be able to take, emergency action other than through the plenary inter-state organs, as with the WHO’s travel advisories during the SARS crisis, or urgent humanitarian actions of the UNHCR, OCHA, and other agencies.4 In some cases, such as the actions on SARS taken by Director-General Brundtland,5 the legal basis and mandate for the actions were not necessarily clear, there were potential risks of liability, and some significant opposition or foot-dragging by relevant governments, all of which might easily deter another IO leader from taking necessary action in a different crisis situation (and lessons learnt during SARS emergency led to both empowerment and limitations in WHO’s responses to later challenges such as pandemic virus H1N1). In other cases, IOs may develop informal administrative actions that go beyond the traditional mechanisms: as happened with the WTO’s initial response to the recent 2008–2009 financial crisis.6


1) To give one example, the application of environmental law standards to the operations of IOs (and PPPs) is likely to be of increasing operational importance, beyond the familiar ones arising in development projects. FAO faces issues concerning safe disposal of unused agricultural chemicals shipped to African countries many decades ago; UN peacekeeping forces may work in areas where endangered species are threatened, as with gorillas in the eastern DRC; refugee camps may face problems of waste management and affect land use patterns in surrounding areas; a UN administrator may suddenly have charge of an environmentally damaging or potentially unsafe coal mine in the Balkans; issues arise concerning environmental impact assessment and access to information under Aarhus Convention standards for various UN operations; financial conditionalities may have environmental consequences.


2. Human Rights in the Work of IOs. Human rights standards are of pervasive importance in the modern public arena of IOs, not only in the protection and fair treatment of the IO's own staff and contractors, or in the structuring of IO processes so as to comply with procedural human rights standards (e.g. in investigations), but also in the observance of substantive human rights of third parties where the IO affects them directly or indirectly, through the actions of a partnership or contractor.\(^7\) GAL issues arise also in the organization and operations of institutions with a specific human rights or humanitarian mandate.

3. Field Offices and Missions of IOs. Many IOs conduct or orchestrate field operations, whether through permanent field offices, sending visiting teams convened by headquarters, or contracting other public or private agencies. While many of the legal issues are well regulated through privileges and immunities conventions, status of forces agreements, and other traditional legal modalities, a number of different challenges arise on a daily basis: the relationships of the field unit to HQ and to host states and local political actors; the effective governance of field activities by contract, and by audit, investigation and staff discipline procedures based at HQ; and the practical application of anti-corruption, procurement, and elementary human rights standards, such as for the UNHCR’s operations.\(^8\)

4. IO Public-Private Partnerships. IOs increasingly form, and operate through, formalized partnerships made with private commercial and civil society entities.\(^9\) The growth of these Public/Private Partnerships (PPPs) has been driven in part by the ideology or culture of “new public management”,\(^10\) and many of the relevant legal issues are the same as those arising for IOs

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from privatization and outsourcing of activities that in earlier epochs they would themselves have undertaken. A good illustration of the PPP model is the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which has close links with the World Health Organization, but is, in formal legal terms, a Swiss Foundation. Its Board is comprised of ten donors (eight donor or developed states, one business sector representative (in 2009 McKinsey & Co) and one private foundation (in 2009 the Gates Foundation)), and ten recipients or implementers (seven developing states, one northern and one southern NGO, and one representative of groups affected by HIV and other infectious diseases the Global Fund combats), along with (as non-voting members) the WHO, UNAIDS, the World Bank, and one Swiss citizen (required for a Swiss Foundation). Recommendations are made also by a large Partnership Forum of stakeholders. The Global Fund has a sophisticated independent review system in its decision-making on grant applications (the Technical Review Panel), as well as oversight of policies and operations by a Technical Evaluation Reference Group (practitioners, academics, etc) and by an Office of the Inspector-General (oversight of in-country and Secretariat operations).

5. Non-Treaty Normative Instruments of IOs. IOs issue (publicly or internally) many forms of recommendations, guidelines, best practices, technical advice, findings, conclusions, committee rules, and other norma-

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tive products. Debates about the legal character and effects of such normative materials ("soft law" etc), and debates about the sources of legal authority to produce such materials with significant normative effects (law-making power), do not exhaust the field of legal questions concerning these outputs of IOs. We refer in particular to the legal dimensions of increasing demands for GAL elements such as transparency, reason-giving, review, and in some cases participation or accountability, in relation to these instruments; different agencies take widely different approaches to such demands, and there is often uncertainty about the exact legal framework applicable to the production of these instruments, and about what procedural standards are – or ought to be – required.

All five of these areas of contemporary practice can be understood as forms of administration (lato sensu). In each area, sound administrative processes guided by an understanding of (emerging) principles of administrative law and good practice on global governance are already being used to some extent, and if more widely embraced might make a difference for the better. We offer in this paper a short sketch of some ways in which a global administrative law approach, broadly understood, may be significant for these issues. We by no means suggest that this is a comprehensive perspective, but it may provide a valuable, and thus far overly neglected, addition to established approaches.

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16) Administrative, legislative, and adjudicative functions may blur in some IOs. Administration “can be distinguished from legislation in the form of treaties, and from adjudication in the form of episodic dispute settlement between states or other disputing parties” (Kingsbury et al., supra note 1, p. 17). Therefore we mean administration in a wider sense than, for example, the discussion of “expanding global bureaucracy” in M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2004), p. 156 et seq. (examining the legitimacy of this bureaucracy.)

Several unifying threads woven through these issues are of particular significance for this paper. First, the growth of IO activities in these areas raises specific normative pressures for what is already a fast-growing application of various mixes of GAL principles, particularly concerning transparency (a governance of information, including demands for active transparency and access to information, but also demands for confidentiality and privacy, and for legal or political controls on the gathering and use of policy-shaping information), participation, and reason-giving, along with more general pressures for review of administrative-type actions, and for heightened accountability with consequences for regimes of liability and immunity.

Second, the proliferation of IOs and other institutions exercising public power or authority in global governance, accompanied by various forms of institutional differentiation and decentralization as well as complex field operations, has intensified the need for principles to structure the relations amongst these enterprises. Such principles might be thought of as constitutional, or as general principles of public law, or more pragmatically as elements of co-ordination; and in many cases they are principles of administration. The relations between inter-governmental organizations, and the relations between such IOs and many other entities in global administrative law perspectives, and international institutional law. All of them formulate important insights for a public law approach: that constitutional sensibility as well as comparative openness to administrative law concepts should inform the analysis of the material at hand, and that international institutional law should be the disciplinary basis for further inquiries” (p. 1390); see also A. von Bogdandy et al. (eds.), The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions. Advancing International Institutional Law (Springer, Heidelberg, 2010). For analysis of “global constitutionalism”, see J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009); and J. Klubbers, A. Peters, and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009).


governance (including state agencies), have the distinctive feature that these are relations between public entities. Public entities are themselves subject to certain principles of publicness, of which GAL principles are one instantiation. Thus the relations between these public entities are to some extent conditioned by the nature of these entities and the public law principles that shape, empower, and constrain these entities. The relations among them can be characterized in terms of inter-public law.21 GAL helps to structure processes to deal with overlapping and potentially conflicting assertions of applicable norms or of administrative competence by such entities, or overlaps and problems of responsibility and accountability in their field operations, or process incompatibilities (e.g. where one entity regards itself as obliged to make public information which another has promised is confidential).

Third, the interaction among the various institutions, state agencies, other actors, norms, ideas, values, policy choices, motivations, and influences on behavior, is not readily reducible to a simple system of rules and rule-appliers. It is regulatory, and dynamic. Embedding the analysis of law and legal process in the wider context of global governance, while retaining a concept of law and use of legal techniques, is essential.22

2. The Conceptual and Legal Framework: The Limits of International Law and the Emergence of Global Administrative Law

The proliferation and differentiation of IOs, and the expanded range and significance of their activities,23 have been understood as a challenge (and


22) Kingsbury, supra note 1.

23) The number of international organizations (IOs) has been increasing steadily. In 2006, there were 61,345 international governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); in 1981, 14,752; in 1960, 1,422; in 1951, 955; taking into account the IGOs only, in 2006, there were 7,530; in 1981, 1,039; in 1960, 154; in 1951, 123 (see Yearbook of International Organizations 2008, published by UIA). Comparing data from 2001 and 2006: IGOs numbered 7,080 and 7,530 respectively; NGOs, 48,202 and 53,815; making the total number of IOs 55,282 in 2001 as compared to 61,345 in 2006. Total personnel and
opportunity) for international law since the 1860s or earlier. It was common in the late 19th century and early 20th century to regard many of these issues as part of an international law of administration,24 or international administrative law,25 and a large set of these IOs were analyzed under the rubric of ‘international administrative unions’.26 A field of international institutional law developed,27 typically oriented in a progressive fashion toward a “law of cooperation” going beyond an austere “law of co-existence”;28

total financing of IOs have inevitably increased. In the case of the United Nations, despite stringent limitations on its growth set by the member states in many fields of activity, the dramatic growth in peacekeeping and other activities has seen an overall expansion in its operations. In 1997, the UN itself employed 13,627 officers; by 2007, this number had risen to 31,494 (UN, Basic Information on United Nations System Organizations. Mission, Structure, Financing, and Governance – UN website). Across the entire UN system, there were 52,107 officers in 1997 and 75,282 in 2007; the budget of the UN system was $6.4 billion in 2007, rising from around $5 billion in 1997 (UN, Personnel Statistics (Data as at 31 December 2007) and Budgetary and financial situations of organizations of the United Nations system – UN website).

24) F.F. Martens, Le droit international actuel des peuples civilisés (3 vols, 1883) devotes one volume largely to this topic.
although standard international relations theory suggests that IOs and other international institutions can have significance even under tensely realist conditions of inter-state relations. The sanguine view that “when a problem arises in international life and relations, an international organization is developed to deal with it”,\(^\text{29}\) has long since ceased to represent orthodox political ideology or international relations practice, as demands for value-for-money, “new governance” approaches, contracting-out, and the use of informal institutions\(^\text{30}\) have become increasingly influential.

The field of international institutional law has begun to confront the demands for deeper conceptual foundations and a more expansive theoretical and policy understanding.\(^\text{31}\) Jan Klabbers argues that there is a “paradox” within international institutional law:

> As soon as organizations become more than debating clubs, as soon as they exercise public authority, it becomes possible and plausible to wonder whether they do a good job, or whether someone else would have done better. When organizations start to administer territory, or impose and monitor sanctions regimes, or regulate markets,


or set standards, discussions will start about how they do so, and whether they do so well enough to merit further support. They operate, so to speak, on the market of legitimacy, and legitimacy, however precisely conceptualized, is a scarce resource. And when this happens, the organization loses its character as organization and becomes something else – whatever the "something else" may be.32

It is often argued that public deliberative institutions unavoidably have, and ought to have, two different logics that variously meld and compete: a logic of talk and a logic of action,33 or a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequences. This dichotomy is too simple, but it is perhaps true that international institutional law has on the whole (with exceptions) not been highly effective in providing a deep structure for the operational or administrative-type activities of IOs. Scholarly writings on international institutional law have contributed much on constitutional issues concerning the competences of IOs and their various organs and about the relationships between them and the member states,34 and on staff issues. Legal issues relating to decision-making processes within IOs,35 and to intra-organizational

32) Klabbers, supra note 31, p. 169 et seq. Klabbers also explains: “First, to the extent that the law of an international organization covers only the internal legal order and is really residual (each organization is sui generis and has its own legal order), there cannot be said to exist any international institutional law. Second, the more active and successful organizations become, the less their existence will be seen as a specific branch of law; instead, they will be subjected to general public international law, even without a plausible theory of obligation”.

33) N. Brunsson, The Organization of Hypocrisy: Talk, Decisions and Actions in Organizations (2nd edn, 2003). Klabbers is perhaps making such a point in asserting: “It may be the case, in other words, that organizations are at their best, their purest, so to speak, when they do nothing, because only then do they offer a platform for discussion, for debate, for politics. What I have called elsewhere the ‘agora’ function may be crucial to the survival of organizations – and for the law of international organizations” (supra note 31, p. 170).


matters such as the relationships between IO headquarters and their field offices, have been studied much less.\footnote{In a certain way, a similar phenomenon occurred in the domestic administrative law, during the XX century. For a long period of time, in fact, administrative lawyers focused mostly on the acts of public administrations and review on them, without considering their proceedings and their internal organizational framework: see S. Cassese, \textit{La Construction du droit administratif: France et Royaume-Uni} (Montchrestien, Paris, 2000), and G. Napolitano (ed.), \textit{Diritto amministrativo comparato} (Giuffrè, Milano, 2007).}

Proliferation of IOs has been accompanied not only by increased differentiation in types of IOs,\footnote{Attempts to classify and categorize IOs in light of this proliferation and differentiation include the clusters and groups used by the Yearbook of International Organizations (UIA), and also efforts by international institutional law scholars. See Schermers and Blokker, \textit{supra} note 27, p. 48 et seq.; Klabbers, \textit{supra} note 27, p. 23 et seq., and Klabbers, ‘Two Concepts of International Organization’, 2:2 \textit{International Organizations Law Review} (2005) pp. 277–293. An international legal history of the growth of IOs and their functions is sketched by J.E. Alvarez, \textit{International Organizations as Law-makers} (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), p. 17 et seq.} but also by growing complexity of many regimes, due to increased density of norms and mandates, interactions with other IOs and with non-IO actors, and the simple increase in the number of states participating in IOs (the WTO, for instance, currently has more than 150 member states, whilst in the original GATT 1947 there were 23).\footnote{On these aspects, see J. Pauwelyn, “New Trade Politics for the 21st Century”, 11 \textit{Journal of International Economic Law} (2008) pp. 559–573.} Networks of IOs acting together have in some cases gone beyond inter-agency co-ordination and cooperation, to the development of new institutional models. A first pattern is when states and IOs themselves create other specialized agencies or committees: take, for instance, the International Agency for Research on Cancer, established in 1965 as an extension of WHO, which has, however, its own governing bodies, or the well-known Codex Alimentarius Commission. A second pattern is exemplified by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), an inter-IO structure to provide funding and maximize the coherence and effectiveness of project design and selection.\footnote{This point is underlined by L. Boisson de Chazournes, “The Global Environment Facility Galaxy: On Linkages among Institutions”, in J.A. Frowein and R. Wolfrum (eds.), \textit{Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law}, vol. 3 (1999) p. 243 et seq.} Another is the creation in IOs of mechanisms or even specific entities to link national administrative bodies together, exemplified by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s system of National...
Contact Points (NCPs) under the development of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.40 A fourth pattern is contracting by IOs with private entities, or more ambitiously the creation of public-private partnership mechanisms. This pattern draws in transnational private law, with its deepening procedural and institutional dimensions, many of the legal forms cannot clearly be designated as private or public.41

Increased focus on the legitimacy and accountability of global institutions,42 the formation of global networks,43 and other features of the organization (vel non) of global governance,44 have not produced practical or scholarly agreement on a legal framework for understanding and structuring these phenomena. It has long been recognized that insights from administrative law, and from public law more generally, may help provide conceptual resources. Specific formal and operational features of IOs may be, unsurprisingly, similar to those found in national administrations.45 An example was the functionalist approach to IOs propounded in Geneva by Michel Virally which,46 in

40) See <www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,es_2649_34889_1933116_1_1_1_1,00.html>.
using function as the basis for “an attempt to provide coherence and unity to theory in the field of international organizations law”, overlapped with national law theories in which the public function of administrative action (the public interest, identified and regulated by law) justifies application of public-regarding administrative law rules to the administrative actors. Another example is the contemporary application in IOs of theories of global public goods, in which administrations are again conceived of as instruments for furthering a definable public interest. An administrative perspective on the work of IOs enables analysis of practices already occurring in IOs (and insufficiently assimilated in international law scholarship) which reflect changing patterns in contemporary management practices and philosophies more generally, such as new public management (steering-not-rowing, user charges, separation of funders from providers of services), or outsourcing and governance-by-contract.

More generally, the practice of IOs has some parallels with earlier national experience concerning such matters as: the proliferation and fragmentation of public bodies; the growing use of private law instruments; the increase in administrative rulemaking (a major feature of the US New Deal, addressed in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946); and the establishment of multiple field offices (a feature of the French administrative system). Any transposition

47) Blokker, supra note 31, p. 201.
49) In this way, it becomes possible to identify the administration in theoretical terms (this is the German Begriff der Verwaltung), but it remains both difficult and unnecessary to attempt a unitary definition in practical terms. To consider administration as functionally oriented towards achieving a public goal produces variability in the delimitation of the public sphere: there is not, therefore, one single definition, but rather a range of notions of what can constitute “public administration”.
from state legal systems to the complex real practices of inter-governmental institutions in global governance is challenged, however, by fundamental differences between these enterprises. That many important activities of IOs can be regarded as administrative in nature does not remotely suggest the existence of a general global public administration; there is no global government or global parliament, nor are there real global equivalents of other structures within which national administrations are nested. Nevertheless, some normative demands and procedural principles are sufficiently common across diverse IOs to suggest a unified field may be discernable: transparency in rule-making; due process (in certain cases including notice, hearings, and reason-giving requirements) in decisions that directly affect private parties; review mechanisms to correct errors and ensure rationality and legality; and in addition to review, a variety of other mechanisms to promote accountability. These are among the key ideas in the exploration of a unified field of legal practice and study of global administrative law (GAL).

Many GAL principles are actively embraced in particular IOs, and these principles provide a basis for serious discussion and critique in the work of others. Thus transparency and participation are current preoccupations in relation to the WTO, and due process is intensely debated in relation to the WTO.

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to sanctions against individuals imposed by the UN Security Council. In some other IO contexts, even consideration of such principles, let alone application of them, is incidental at most. Some of the demands made by reference to GAL principles are unrealistic and potentially counter-productive: for example, too much accountability to the wrong people can be pathological; immense and perhaps insuperable problems arise in adequate representation or direct participation of civil society-type actors and their interests, so that compromises on this are often inescapable; at the global level participatory rights should be accorded considering the different nature of actors involved, which can be either private or public (such as states and domestic administrative agencies) or both; notice and comment’ requirements for rule-making can facilitate the capture of the process by special interest groups; entitlements to a lengthy hearing and appeal may “ossify” procedures and dissuade an underfunded and overstretched agency from acting at all.

With these considerations in mind, we turn in the next sections briefly to highlight five areas of current operational practice of IOs to which we believe a GAL approach may make some contribution.

3. Five Sets of Practical Legal Problems of IOs in GAL Perspective

3.1. Emergency Actions by IOs: Leadership, Legal Mandate, Accuracy, Review Mechanisms, and Liability Issues

Emergency actions by IOs in crisis situations can be extremely important. One central challenge has been establishing an adequate legal and political
order for such actions. The growth of a field of humanitarian emergency action since the 1970s, with vastly-increased numbers of NGOs and volunteers operating on the ground (and in fund-raising) in the same space as numerous inter-governmental organizations and foreign and local state agencies, has been accompanied by an “emergency imaginary” in which emergency is “a sort of counterpoint to the idea of global order”. Attempts by IOs to follow established legal and administrative procedures in such situations have been caricatured, often rightly, as hopelessly ponderous and as putting bureaucratic routines above human suffering. Overlaid on this are demands, mainly from states, that IOs and hybrid or private international institutions respond rapidly to what are claimed to be security emergencies, whether by handing over personal data, ordering bank accounts frozen, withdrawing observers, sending inspectors, or even authorizing an invasion.

One approach to this can be pursued through general international law doctrine: implied powers of IOs, responsibility of IOs, duties to cooperate including duties of states to admit necessary aid and personnel in natural disasters, and legal doctrines concerning protection of human rights and of community organizations in humanitarian emergencies.

A second approach focuses more on institutions. Efforts to structure emergency responses through bodies which clearly have powers to take such actions, the UN Security Council, (e.g.,) may contribute both to the political legitimacy of such actions and to the clarity of their legal bases. Some IOs have taken steps to provide an organized legal and policy framework


for some of their actions in possible future emergencies. The World Bank, for example, has structures for rapid response to emergencies, including disbursement through streamlined procedures, the possibility of retroactive authorization of finance provided before legal agreements could be put in place, downward delegation of decision-making authority, grants to local public or private entities or to IOs or international NGOs as an alternative to making grants to the state where necessary in “weak-capacity environments”, and attenuation where necessary of ex ante controls to be balanced by greater on-going supervisory controls against fraud, corruption, and other risks.62 A second example is the adoption by the IAEA in 2002 of its Action Plan against the threat of nuclear terrorism. Similarly, the WHO Director General rightly judged that the SARS crisis called for the WHO to operate immediately, beyond its clear powers and perhaps beyond its explicit treaty mandate, adopting recommendations and measures addressed and sent by email to airline companies and other private subjects, even individuals;63 in one assessment (which requires much qualification), “the global governance model that emerged during SARS accorded the WHO independent power vis-à-vis its member states, an astonishing development that indicates the extent to which Westphalian governance has been abandoned”.64 The International Health Regulations were extensively revised in 2006 to take some account of this experience and regularize future emergency practice, including giving affected states some more influence or control over WHO actions.

The reality in many IOs, however, is that plenary and even executive board inter-state institutions may be ineffective at managing emergency responses: considerable discretion and authority may have to devolve on the secretariat and professional leadership (acting with support from specific states, or in collaboration with other IOs or state agencies or private actors), raising problems of mandate, powers (vires), oversight, and legal accountability. Thus, for instance, the WTO’s initial response to the 2008–2009 financial crisis consisted in considerable part of emergency actions taken by the Director

62) World Bank Operational Policy 8.00 on Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (March 2007); World Bank, Bank Procedures 8.00 on Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (March 2007).
64) D.P. Fidler, “Constitutional Outlines of Public Health’s ‘New World Order’”, in Sapsin et al., supra note 63, p. 268.
General and the Secretariat, and not by WTO legislative or judicial bodies. The adoption of a public law conceptual framework, encompassing global administrative law dimensions, is potentially a promising way forward. One illustrative example is the principle that review mechanisms should be available where improper exercises of power may have seriously detrimental or abusive effects.

The structuring and roles of review mechanisms in relation to such emergency actions raises complex problems. Where the action is taken by the Director General or a comparable official, a political review may be conducted by the IO’s inter-state assembly or executive board, which may in effect ratify the action, remain agnostic, issue criticism which may be accompanied by sanctions, or take action oriented to future cases. Other political checks also operate, as with the role in relation to the World Bank of individual executive directors and of political bodies in major contributing states or in the EU. Legal checks may be achieved internally if the legal counsel has a powerful role and relative independence. Inter-institutional processes may be important, as with interactions between UN headquarters and UN specialized agencies such as those between the World Bank and the UN over the role and interpretation of General Assembly resolutions and particularly over the interpretation and reach of Security Council resolutions. In such contexts mandate issues and concerns about “mission-creep” may properly arise, and bureaucratic turf battles may and do hamper needed action.

National courts have played essential roles in democratic countries in limiting excesses or abuses of emergency powers, and both national and regional or supranational courts have been asked to exercise some review functions in relation to implementation of IO measures, particularly Security Council financial sanctions against named individuals and groups. But while

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65) Pauwelyn and Berman, supra note 6.

66) For example, Security Council Resolution 1747 (2007), adopted in the context of concerns about Iran’s nuclear program, which: “Calls upon all States and international financial institutions not to enter into new commitments for grants, financial assistance, and concessional loans, to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, except for humanitarian and developmental purposes.” The World Bank seems to have interpreted all of its activities as falling within the exception, but the Security Council could have challenged that interpretation in a review function had it decided to do so.

67) von Bernstorff, supra note 20, p. 1945 et seq.
some blocking or criticizing of implementation has occurred, and national
governments have paid compensation for some implementation actions they
could not later justify, the further step of imposing non-contractual liability
on an IO for emergency action remains rare. Liability concerns could have a
chilling effect on action: as could easily have happened with the WHO’s warn-
ings and travel advisories regarding SARS, which had major consequences
for private economic operators as well as entire cities and regions.

In addition to review, other global administrative law principles such
as transparency, participation, and reason-giving may be applicable to IO
emergency actions, but with specific limits and inflections for different
IOs and in different circumstances. Issues concerning application of these
public law principles sit alongside questions of institutional design, output-
legitimacy, resource availability, effectiveness, and political sustainability, in
what should become a sub-field of specialized work on emergency powers
of IOs and other actors in global governance.

3.2. Human Rights Dimensions of IO Operations: GAL Aspects

The human rights elements of IO operations have several distinct dimen-
sions from the standpoint of GAL. First, IOs act in emergency contexts
or other difficult situations, providing emergency shelter or food or water
or sanitation, administering camps, negotiating with governments about
treatment of dissidents, intervening to prevent abuses by armies and militias
or even on occasion by NGOs. This is the frontline of human rights in
emergency situations, in which every success and every failure or inability
is of desperate importance.

Second, IOs may in their activities impinge on human rights, or trade
off some human rights protection in pursuit of other objectives. The

68) A.J. Miller, “Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Officials”, 4:2 International

69) See H.J. Steiner et al., International Human Rights In Context. Law, Politics, Morals,
Idealism and Realism, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), T. Buergenthal,
“The Evolving International Human Rights System”, 100 American Journal of International

70) See F. Rawski, “Engaging with Armed Groups: A Human Rights Field Perspective From
Nepal”, in this symposium on “Global Administrative Law in the Operations of International
familiar legal debates about the applicability of human rights law to IOs should not obscure the general feature of IOs: that accountability is strong (perhaps excessive) to funders and founders (i.e. states which in some sense delegate power to the IO), but often uneven with regard to other interests, in particular the interests of those third parties whom the IO affects. This issue is most acute with regard to human rights of individuals, particularly vulnerable individuals and groups with little ability to influence the IO directly or indirectly. Many IOs are now addressing these problems seriously, but the challenges remain formidable.

Third, relationships between IO headquarters and their field presence may precipitate some human rights complications71 – for example, it may be difficult for a local UN human rights mission to threaten to exclude army units abusing human rights locally from further participation in lucrative UN peacekeeping work, if UN HQ has desperate need for those forces in other missions – and going beyond field offices, the practical and legal problems of coordination, authority, competition, and human rights responsibility among various actors (inter-governmental, state, PPPs, and private or non-governmental) can be acute, as for instance in demining.72 Such problems are compounded where action is taken under emergency conditions. In all of these cases, GAL issues must be integrated with effectiveness and efficiency objectives, to actually promote and protect human rights.73

Fourth, the specific structural machinery of IOs aimed to promote and protect human rights requires much more systematic analysis from

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70) Pallis, supra note 8.


a GAL perspective than it has yet received. This includes issues such as transparency and reason-giving (or not) in the work of the UN Human Rights Council and other bodies, transparency in appointment processes and mandate formulation and approved activities of special rapporteurs and special representatives, the use of review mechanisms and their effective operation, the effective and fair treatment of complainants/victims and other interested parties, the speed of work and the adequacy of the deliberative processes of human rights bodies, their criteria for taking up or not taking up particular cases, the adequacy of due process and notice to potential targets of international human rights investigations, and the robustness of fact-finding processes.

Fifth, IOs act to concretize or embellish already-agreed legal human rights standards (usually formulated in global or regional treaties) through sub-treaty normative activities: adopting guidelines, best practices and other documents of relatively general application; monitoring (including use of guidelines, for example, by the OSCE); deploying newer techniques such as devising or using indicators to measure human rights compliance, which may come de facto to define what the human right means; deciding what to accept or not accept in a specific post-conflict peace deal or other negotiated solution; making determinations about individual situations, thereby establishing significant interpretations and precedents; and the creation of specialist institutions such as the Lebanon criminal investigatory mechanism and tribunal.

A descant over and above these five specific issues is heard in arguments that human rights may be acquiring a “constitutional” nature in global institutions of public governance, thus creating a hierarchy of values and public interests which may be recognized by the different actors involved: IOs, states, national administrations, courts. Such arguments are often

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made by reference to wider claims concerning the globalization of law\textsuperscript{77} or “global constitutionalism”.\textsuperscript{78}

3.3. \textit{GAL and the Administration of Field Offices and Field Missions of IOs}

Closely connected to the rise of emergency actions is the increase in field offices of IOs. After some studies conducted in the 1960s,\textsuperscript{79} the topic of administration of field operations of IOs was largely neglected in the academic literature. However, it began to regain importance during the 1990s, with the increase in UN and other IO conflict-related field operations and international territorial administration.\textsuperscript{80}

During the last ten years, field (i.e. non-HQ) operations and activities of many IOs have been growing relative to HQ. To take the UN system, in 2007 field personnel made up 61\% of the total staff (45,818), rising to more than 75\% in the case of WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, and UNHCR; in 1997, by contrast, the general figure stood at 44\% of total staff (22,788). The HQ staff in 2007 consisted of 26,980 officers (36\%), whilst there were 21,713 (42\%) in 1997.\textsuperscript{81}

This growing importance of field operations reflects the nature of the public goods or public goals that these IOs pursue, as well as a general


\textsuperscript{78}) See Dunoff and Trachtman, supra note 17; Klabbers, Peters, and Ulfstein, supra note 17.


\textsuperscript{81}) United Nations, \textit{Personnel Statistics (Data as at 31 December 2007)}, op cit. The remaining officers were employed on specific projects: 15\% of total staff on 1997 (7,606 officers), against only 3\% in 2007 (2,484 officers). See also n. 23.
emphasis placed (or at least ostensibly placed) by member states on “action” getting beyond “talk”, and in particular an emphasis on action relating to development or to humanitarian crises. Whether field operations are necessarily more action-oriented and less bureaucratic than HQ activities is a different question. There are of course many variations in IOs field offices and field operations, differences of function and indeed ideology, as illustrated by nomenclature for field activities: office, presence, department, mission, resident. Some IOs are structured around a permanent and wide-spread network of regional offices or field administrations. Regional structures are formally prescribed for the WHO and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), for example. Many types of field activities, however, respond to local problems which are at least hoped to be temporary: peacekeeping, refugee operations, and human rights work of IOs in situations of violence, abuse, or risk.82

Field administrations tend to grow when there are demands from different states that the IO have a presence in the state or region (the Global Fund, for example, seems almost inexorably to face demands that it should have a project in each developing country, even if this does not maximize cost-effectiveness in improving health outcomes), or when the policy environment favors decentralization and subsidiarity.83 Decentralization of IOs can (but need not) involve significant devolution of powers; powers of relatively autonomous field offices might diminish the powers of the HQ, and nullify or dissipate the centralization of responsibilities intended by the states that originally created the IO.84 Such issues also arise where an IO’s structure has both network and hierarchical elements: for example,

83 The World Bank, for example, has made decentralization one of its criteria for good governance in the sphere of investment projects in depressed areas, pushing many Asian and African countries towards the strengthening of local and regional government structures: N. Devas and S. Delay, “Local Democracy and the Challenges of Decentralising the State: An International Perspective”, 32 Local Government Studies (2006) pp. 677–695, particularly p. 679. Impacts on IOs have not been much considered.
where a global IO does not entirely subsume preexisting organizations (as in the WHO-PAHO relationship), or where universal IOs form close-knit networks with regional IOs, or where multiple IOs form networks with some common operations and allocations of responsibility.

There is emerging (though still in a modest way) a specialist expertise on field administration of IOs,\(^{85}\) approached from at least two perspectives. The first refers to the organizational framework, i.e. to the typology of field offices, their powers, and their relationship with headquarters. This kind of analysis deepens insight into the functioning of IOs worldwide, and into the legal tools they are using. The second perspective focuses on field operations conducted by IOs themselves, including: UN and regional organization peace-keeping operations;\(^{86}\) local development and reform activities, especially post-conflict;\(^{87}\) direct international administration of territory; UNHCR refugee-related supervisory responsibilities;\(^{88}\) and refugee status determinations, which can be an administration of persons;\(^{89}\) election


\(^{89}\) See Barnett and Finnemore, *supra* note 16, p. 73 et seq.
monitoring; certification of environmental compliance; aid for trade initiative; humanitarian assistance; and human rights operations of many kinds. Much attention is now being given to the regime of legal or *de facto* immunities granted to IO officers and contractors in these operations; problems concerning waiver of such immunities; and judicial or other accountability mechanisms which can be adopted.

Field administration relates closely to other operational issues: PPPs and contracting out; production of norms in less-formal ways; powers

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in emergency situations especially for the protection of human rights. The blend of concerns about legitimacy, accountability, effectiveness, and efficacy can be distinctive in certain field situations: local participation (of national administrations and civil society), sometimes through PPPs, may be functionally and politically essential in order to accomplish field missions, in ways that do not hold for HQ operations. On the other hand, however, it is becoming ever more difficult for IOs in their current operations to meet legitimate accountability demands, avoid “capture” by special interests or stasis due to state manipulation, respect the interests of third parties especially the poor and vulnerable, and maintain operational effectiveness. Traditional international law tools are relevant, but inadequate for this purpose. A GAL methodology, which integrates accountability with principles and mechanisms of transparency, participation, and review in rule-making and in actions affecting individuals and identifiable groups, may contribute to a unified and effective approach to these problems in specific contexts.96

3.4. Public-Private Partnerships of IOs: Legal Issues, and Wider Problems of Privatization

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) involving inter-governmental organizations as one of the partners are important in the global governance of such areas as public health (including organizations such as the Global Fund and GAVI),97 nuclear safety (the IAEA acts in a framework built upon

a complex set of conventions, agreements, and MOU, either binding or non-binding), environmental protection, the internet, and sports.

The growing engagement by IOs in hybrid public-private bodies, and their use or concerted action with such bodies and with fully private bodies as well as with state military forces and agencies, raises heightened accountability problems. The use of PPPs and contractors can potentially contribute to evasion of IO accountability, diminished use of legal and legal-type instruments for organization and control of activities, extension beyond established mandates, and avoidance of transparency on grounds such as commercial confidentiality. Conversely, there are circumstances in which use of PPPs and contractors may improve accountability, raise

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102) On issues concerning private military companies, including their relations to IO peace operations, see S. Chesterman and C. Lehnardt (eds.), From Mercenaries to Market. The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007). On regulation of this sector generally, see J. Cockayne et al., Beyond Market Forces: Regulating the Global Security Industry (International Peace Institute, New York, 2009). Regulation of private actors in the security/violence sector is compared to regulation of privatized prisons, privatized utilities, and other sectors in Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher (eds.), Private
the standard of operations to industry-leader levels, heighten controls of legality through contracting, improve specificity and clarity of mandates, widen participation, and enhance transparency. At the same time, IOs may come to bear a disproportionate or unrealistic share of accountability and responsibility (including through attribution to them of acts and omissions of others), especially as the IO may be a more visible, more responsive, and more enduring target for complaints than some states, many PPPs, and most contractors. Insufficiency of accountability structures and responsiveness may lead to increasing pressure on immunities of IOs and IO staff in national courts. Some of the most difficult legal problems in relation to immunity are likely to concern IO PPPs and contractors, not least because the capacity of IOs themselves to impose strong accountability systems on such actors may be quite limited.

The use of private law instruments by national administrative bodies, and the integration of private actors in national regulatory processes, are among characteristics of the “new public management” in national administration that have been transposed to IOs as techniques and to some extent as ideologies. Responses to these phenomena in national administrative law may thus


104) Indeed, IOs may find it necessary to trigger national criminal prosecutions of such actors in extreme cases, or to launch civil suits against them in national court where arbitration is not sufficiently effective. (Comparable measures have already been taken in several cases against errant IO staff, particularly in situations of alleged corruption or financial misappropriation.)


be of some relevance even in the very different contexts in which IOs operate. GAL approaches to global governance may help in addressing such problems as: under what conditions should global public administrative bodies engage in PPPs and associated private law instruments? What kinds of effective and non-stifling oversight mechanisms could such public bodies use in relation to PPPs? Will these be sufficient to ensure adequate accountability, and legitimacy? Should the various privileges and immunities granted to IOs be extended to the private bodies involved in, or created as a result of, PPPs? The Global Fund, for instance, has privileges and immunities in Switzerland where it is based and in the U.S.A. where much of its money is, but should other states (particularly developing countries where it operates) accord such immunities or in some other ways recognize the Global Fund as a public international organization? Where PPPs directly affect fundamental human rights or other interests of persons, it may be becoming orthodox practice that extension of the regime of immunities and privileges to PPPs (under the condition of a delegation or a similar connection between them and the public IO in question) should be accompanied by rights and guarantees for individuals or legal persons similar to those they have in cognate national public bodies, including rights of access to information.

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112) Regional or national regulations often impose human rights obligations on certain categories of private actors to protect rights and guarantees of civil society or individuals. See, for instance, the UK Human Rights Act of 1998, which defines the “public authorities”
Treating a distinction between public and private as being rigid and obvious risks “to conceal both the complexity of its political history and important potential areas of overlap and compromise in the future”. In relation to the multiple modalities of PPPs, the public/private distinction appears “not as a spectrum with some actions more or less public or private than others”; it is political more than structural, and can be made and remade very quickly. There is considerable imprecision, and tension, about what it means to be “public” in global governance. Given the absence of a decisive referent (beyond the simply inter-state nature of IOs), the public and indeed democratic interests at stake in use of PPPs by IOs call for especially careful procedures, attentive to administrative law mechanisms such as transparency and participation.

3.5. The Increasing Use of Recommendations, Guidelines, Informal Norms, and Technical Advice: The Production of “Soft Law” from the GAL Perspective

IOs influence general international law, and set specific norms which may be binding or non-binding but in any event can have significant implications for other IOs, states, national administrations, and private persons. The
processes for producing such norms vary from one IO to another, from one specific sector to another, from one time to another, and depending on what is sought to be achieved.\textsuperscript{116} Some IOs have long histories of, and an explicit constitutional architecture for, use of norm-setting mechanisms more flexible than treaties or conventions: the ILO’s recommendations, for example, which are monitored by its Committee of Experts.\textsuperscript{117} Similarly the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) adopts hundreds of resolutions and recommendations every year that, even if non-binding, are accepted by its members as regulatory.\textsuperscript{118} ICAO’s Standards and Recommended Practices,\textsuperscript{119} UNESCO Recommendations, and World Bank operational policies are among numerous other examples of this kind of normative activity of inter-governmental organizations.\textsuperscript{120} Even without such a clear constitutional architecture, the OSCE uses such techniques routinely,\textsuperscript{121}


\textsuperscript{121} E.B. Schlager, “A Hard Look at Compliance with ‘Soft’ Law: The Case of the OSCE”, in Shelton, supra note 115, p. 346 \textit{et seq.}
and the UNHCR has also done so out of operational necessity, as with the
UNHCR’s 2003 Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination,
which are not directly binding, but are designed to provide important
guidelines for the agency’s field offices.\textsuperscript{122}

Hybrid public-private international bodies, and some formally private
transnational bodies, may also produce standards, guidelines, policies, best
practices, and other normative instruments which can have considerable
impact, as for example do the Codex Alimentarius Commission,\textsuperscript{123} ISO,
ICANN, WADA,\textsuperscript{124} or the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Reducing the discussion of such normative materials to the binary of
binding/non-binding, or to an amorphous and undifferentiated category
of “soft law”, not only misses much about their widely varying effects, it
diverts attention from questions as to how and under what procedures they
are made, promulgated, reviewed, contested, or subjected to processes of ac-
countability. The issues are similar to those concerning e.g. the International
Health Regulations (IHR) propagated by the WHO.\textsuperscript{125}

In some cases, this spread of normative functions has led to the creation
of complex sectoral legal orders, which may have practical implications
not only for the effects, but also on one view (adumbrated below) for the
legal status, of some of these normative materials. Three examples of these
normative orders may be noted in a very simplified way: the nuclear energy,
health, and trade sectors.

The international nuclear energy order has been developed by the IAEA
through a system of standards and conventions (“a mixture of internationally

\textsuperscript{122} M. Smrkoly, “International Institutions and Individualized Decision-Making: An
1779–1803.

\textsuperscript{123} M. Livermore, “Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation,
pp. 766–801.

\textsuperscript{124} See Casini, supra note 101, and, from a broader perspective, H. Schepel, The Constitution
of Private Governance. Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets, (Hart

\textsuperscript{125} D.P. Fidler, “From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The
325–392, and E. Mack, “The World Health Organization’s New International Health Regula-
tions: Incursions on State Sovereignty and Ill-Fated Response to Global Health Issues”, 7
binding and non-binding principles and norms” 126); moreover, regarding the protection of nuclear materials, IAEA adopts recommendations that “take up where treaties leave off, filling in gaps by furnishing the elaborate detail of protective measures”. 127

The “world order” in the public health sector has at least two distinctive features for present purposes. 128 Firstly, although WHO was conceived in 1948 as a normative organization with powers to adopt conventions and make binding regulations (arts. 19 and 21 of the WHO Const.), it has engaged in explicit law-producing functions much less than many other agencies. Secondly, global public health law inevitably encompasses norms produced in many different functional sectors, such as food safety, arms control, environment, trade, and human rights, and many of these sectors have norm-producing institutional structures quite separate from the WHO. 129

Within this framework, the revised International Health Regulations (IHR) adopted by the WHO after the SARS crisis are important and influential, but the normative and operational environment of their use and interpretation continues to be strongly influenced by PPPs, industry, and other IOs affecting the public health sector. 130

The WTO’s complex system of norms across different fields ranges from GATT and GATS through the TBT and SPS agreements to TRIPS and a set of plurilateral agreements; many of these have some potential for overlap or conflict, on occasion with each other but more problematically with norms of other special regimes or of general international law. 131 Beyond this, the


128) On the global public health order, Fidler, supra note 64.


130) Fidler, supra note 125.

WTO produces guidelines, recommendations, best practices, informal committee or secretariat interpretations. These contribute to normative development and harmonization, and can appear as authoritative interpretations or statements of international law, calling forth hermeneutic issues and interpretive techniques such as reasonableness and proportionality.

The various mechanisms for producing norms other than in traditional treaty form raise familiar and important issues concerning their legal nature, often theorized in the rather amorphous and conceptually obscure notion of “soft law”. One approach to determining the legal character of such norms is to use a positivist theory of law based on H.L.A. Hart rather than positivist theories which depend entirely on showing that the norm has been made into one of international law through the authoritative expression of the will of states in treaty or custom. Law is a social practice. Norms of law generate an internal sense of obligation felt by addressees separately from their calculation of the externally-imposed costs and benefits of following the norm. To be a legal norm, the norm must originate in an authoritative source, which ordinarily involves creation or endorsement of the norm by an inter-state organ (IO) and/or some acceptance of the norm by states (thus


the sectoral normative order may be significant in practice for the status of a particular norm which is part of that order, or falls outside it.) As to relatively technical areas of very specific IO practice, the set of authoritative sources and their application in doubtful cases may be determined by the recognition practice of the key actors in the specific community of expertise on the subject matter and normative regime involved. Thus there is a rule of recognition in Hart’s sense, but for these purposes it is not a general rule of recognition covering the whole of international law, but a rule of recognition among a narrower set of specialized actors. Where the norm-generation or norm-acceptance is only shakily related to the will of states, a relevant factor for outsiders in deciding what weight to give to the norm may be the ways in which it was produced, that is adherence to standards of publicness and desiderata of GAL.136

In IO processes for production of normative materials, participation and information rights are accorded formally to states or governments in many cases, creating a normative expectation that is more and more costly to depart from.137 Among the numerous examples of such routine state participation rights are the Procedures for the Elaboration of Codex Alimentarius Standards and Related Texts, where there are two consultations with Members of the Commission (i.e. Member Nations and Associate Members of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Health Organization (WHO)); or the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention established by the Intergovernmental Committee for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, which enable states parties to participate in the process for the inclusion of cultural sites on the world heritage list.138 IOs frequently extend participation beyond states, national administrations, and other public global institutions to private parties. Among the myriad examples are the WTO’s “Guidelines for arrangements on relations with

136) This argument is developed much more extensively in Kingsbury, supra note 1.
137) Note for example the controversy when, prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, some Security Council member states refused to allow a very detailed report to the UN on Iraq’s weapons programs to be read by other Security Council members.
non-governmental organizations”, the “Public Consultation Guidelines” adopted by the Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC) within the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), and the FAO “Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries”.

The law-making processes of IOs frequently involve numerous committees, commissions, or other bodies that take part in the process: the Codex Alimentarius Commission is a prominent but typical example. This leads to familiar problems of administrative law-making processes. There is a tendency of IOs “to hear what the agency wants to hear” during hearings of expert or technical committees, which might affect the credibility of decisions taken by the agency in question. Scrutiny and/or transparency are often not built into the decision-making process initially, with controversies then ensuing as states and NGOs press for these procedures to be opened up. The WHO did this with regard to the approval of its essential medicines list; moreover, WHO is currently assessing the possibility of introducing more structured forms of participation of NGOs, corporations, and civil society actors in the production of its norms and guidelines. In this example, the backdrop is that the WHO relies on committees of experts, largely appointed by the Organization itself, operating in private without wide participation of states or corporations; however much of the pressure by states or non-state actors (including pressure from the EU) for more participation is aimed at giving a voice to special interests, in some cases those seeking direct commercial advantage, leading to calls for the WHO to continue to resist.

143) An example is the 2009 assessment made by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) – a WHO expert committee but with its own governing bodies – according to which use of sunbeds is “carcinogenic to humans”, like smoking or exposure to asbestos. This clearly could have significant impact on sunbed businesses, and the UK Sunbed Association replied that there is no proven link between the “responsible” use of sunbeds and skin cancer). See the IARC working group report “A review of human carcinogens–Part D:
The implementation of participation, transparency, and access to information may be shaped also by the nature of the review mechanisms available to assess the agency’s decisions on such matters. It is possible that, for individuals and other third parties affected, such rights may be more actively respected when such review mechanisms have been adopted by the IOs in question, whether the model is an Ombudsman or something like the World Bank’s inspection panel.144

4. Conclusion: A GAL Approach to the Law of IOs

Innovation in the focus and methods of work of IOs, exemplified in the five areas considered above, but evident in many other areas also, poses many legal questions that necessitate a broadening, and probably a rethinking, of the field of international institutional law. GAL offers a potentially fruitful perspective from which to address the relevant contemporary problems created by the growth of IOs and their activities, for at least three sets of reasons.

First, demands for accountability affect IOs in myriad ways, and if managed poorly may seriously limit the effectiveness of IOs. Thus oversight and control by states of IOs (accountability to founders and funders) can distort priorities and effective structures, and may even worsen problems of IO misconduct and corruption;145 this is one of the lessons of the Security Council’s involvement in the oil-for-food program.146


Second, in all of the five areas discussed above, an important feature is institutional differentiation in IOs and in the wider global governance environment on a particular issue. This phenomenon features both a horizontal dimension – such as for relations between IOs and other global actors – and a vertical one – e.g., the relationships between IOs, states, and national administrations. Most IOs can be now studied along these coordinates: thus the WTO has both the vertical dimension represented by the relations between the WTO and its members’ domestic administrations, and the horizontal dimension presented by the WTO’s recognition (through the TBT and particularly the SPS agreements) of regulatory standards set by other global regulatory bodies. Moreover, the proliferation and differentiation of IOs lead to the multiplication, on one hand, of IO field offices, and, on the other, of new specialized domestic bodies (this often happens with hybrid public and private regimes, such as ISO, Internet, or sports). The relations among all of these entities of global governance that themselves operate under public law principles, may usefully be analyzed in terms of inter-public law.

Third, IO activities produce or entail a multiplicity of rules, principles, decisions, soft-law, and non-legal norms, which may be layered over each other historically. These are now produced and administered in a bewildering

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variety of institutional settings and interpretive communities, in ways that are often fragmented and incompletely reconciled. Fragmentation is not so much a problem, or a solution, or an analytic idea: it is simply a feature. It entails that many practical and normative activities of IOs, and of the other actors in complex governance regimes, must be managed not simply by formal norms and rules of jurisdiction or hierarchical or interpretive solutions to overlaps, but by a dynamic process of regulation in which global administrative law can play a useful part. Treaty law and traditional customary international law are relevant but not remotely sufficient for this. Regulatory approaches emphasize process, directions of change, gradual improvement rather than instant results, and dynamic rather than simply static analysis. Law in such regulatory processes does not occupy the whole field; and is generated through accretion, accumulation, sifting, dialogue among regimes, and the honing of general principles in balances and interaction with one another for specific contexts. Incorporation of such global administrative law approaches, principles, and techniques may make a significant contribution to the law of international organizations.

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152) S. Cassese, “Is There a Global Administrative Law?”, in von Bogdandy et al., supra note 17, p. 772 et seq.